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13 July 1960

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

13 July 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-Indonesia: The instruments of ratification for the USSR's \$250,000,000 credit for technical and economic aid to Indonesia, signed last February, were exchanged during First Minister Djuanda's recent visit to the USSR. According to the joint communique, agreement was reached for the dispatch of a group of Soviet specialists in 1960 who will assist in drafting recommendations for industrial installations. Both Indonesia and the Soviet Union wish to accelerate use of Soviet economic credits which total \$370,000,-000, but of which only about \$100 million have been obligated and about \$30 million expended.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Republic of the Congo: The secession of Katanga Province from the Congo-unless prevented through mediation—may presage the overthrow of Congo Premier Patrice Lumumba. Albert Kalonji, who heads the anti-Lumumba wing of the National Congo Movement, is predicting that the government will fall within two months. Lumumba's attacks on Brussels' dispatch of troops to the Congo continue to be played up in Moscow and Peiping propaganda. The Congo's request on 12 July for the dispatch of US as well as UN-sponsored troops to the Congo, however, suggests that Lumumba's anti-Western proclivities are being kept in check by President Kasavubu and Foreign Minister Bomboko. The atmosphere in the Congo's major urban centers remains tense, although the number of serious disorders has declined.

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Situation in the Congo

The announced secession of Katanga Province from the Congo, if carried through, may presage the overthrow of Congo Premier Patrice Lumumba. Albert Kalonji, who heads the anti-Lumumba wing of the National Congo Movement, predicted on 11 July that the government will fall within two months. Should Brussels fail to support the concept of an independent Katanga, however, leaders of the secessionist movement might be willing to discuss the question of Katanga's position within the Congo.

In its appeal for UN "assistance" in restoring order, the Congo appears to envision both the immediate dispatch of a UN police force and longer term assistance in restoring discipline within the mutinous Force Publique. The Congo's request for intervention by US troops—issued by the cabinet in the absence of President Kasavubu and Lumumba—reportedly would involve the dispatch of 3,000 US soldiers "within the framework of UN technical assistance."

A major factor in the Congo's appeal appears to be Lumumba's desire to end Belgium's unilateral intervention on behalf of its nationals. Should a UN-sponsored force be sent to the Congo, however, Lumumba might attempt to use it to coerce the return of Katanga Province. Although there are indications that he may be kept under some restraint by President Kasavubu and Foreign Minister Bomboko, Lumumba has periodically issued statements attacking the presence of Belgian troops and blaming Brussels for the mutiny in the Force Publique.

In his press conference in the Kremlin on 12 July, Khrushchev denounced the dispatch of troops to the Congo as an effort to "suppress the attainment of independence." Peiping has also charged the United States with preparing to intervene in an attempt to supplant Belgium as the colonial power.

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Pro-Communists in Japan Mount New Propaganda Offensive

With the resignation of the Kishi cabinet, now expected on 14 July, and the early installation of a new prime minister, the conservative Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) will be faced with a need before the general election this fall or winter to close ranks against a mounting leftist effort to neutralize Japan. Pro-Communist elements interpret their success in the recent anti-treaty demonstrations as a major gain in the organization of a broad popular front under Communist direction. They recognize the necessity of winning greater support in the traditionally conservative small cities and farm areas and have created organizations to supplement the work of the "People's Council Against the Security Treaty."

One of the most important of the new propaganda organizations is a "get-to-the-people" movement called Kikyo-Undo, which is composed of leftist students, teachers, professors, and intellectuals who took an active part in the recent demonstrations. Members returning to their home towns during the summer academic recess are expected to press leftist convictions on their rural neighbors in a major effort to penetrate the stronghold of conservative support. In addition, officials of the Japan Socialist party decided on 8 July to send teams of party leaders and speakers throughout the country in July and August.

Pro-Communist elements cite popular acceptance of leftist leadership as their greatest gain in the recent demonstrations, but they concede privately that a substantial gap still exists between the leftist policy of violence and the majority reaction to it, especially outside the major cities. Leftist defeats earlier this month in gubernatorial elections in Aomori and Saitama prefectures, where Socialists made the security treaty a major issue, stimulated formation of Kikyo-Undo and realization of the need to close this gap if pro-Communists are to succeed in severing the US alliance.

The new leftist campaign contrasts sharply with the attitudes of LDP leaders who appear to be lulled by victories in Aomori

and Saitama into taking for granted the party's traditional
rural support. Observers fear that this complacency may
mean that only leftist views will be convincingly presented
in the coming election campaign. Should the LDP fail to
meet this leftist challenge, prospects for the long-range
success of the pro-Communist program will be enhanced.

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Mexican Foreign Minister Manuel Tello released on 11 July a statement declaring that the pro-Cuban sentiments expressed recently by two Mexican congressional leaders do "not necessarily" reflect the views of the Mexican Government but admitting the existence in Mexico of a "profound affection for Cuba." The Tello statement broke the administration's silence on Mexico's position on the US-Cuban controversy, but further clarification is not likely to be forthcoming at this time.

The government's announcement explained—apparently in an effort to curb rising anti—US sentiment in Mexico—that efforts to obtain an official explanation of the Mexican position on Cuba were in line with normal diplomatic practice. Mexico has long been especially sensitive about any action which it interprets as constituting interference in its domestic or foreign affairs.

Mexico is faced with strong pro-Cuban pressures from a leftist minority. Influential ex-President Lazaro Cardenas, long a
stanch defender of the Cuban revolution, also maintained in a speech
of 7 July that the US policy of "economic aggression" against Cuba
was unjustified.

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Guatemalan Student Strike Being Supported by Opposition Groups

	ion factions, joined by university s		
	and Communist-infiltrated labor unions, are openly supporting a month-old strike of secondary students and a two-week-old		
a month-old strike o			
strike of teachers.			
		Rightists	
are causing public unightly in the capital	nrest by setting off small bombs a. l.	lmost	

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The opposition is divided and each group hopes to benefit from the confusion that would follow the fall of the President. It is unlikely, however, that they can bring down the government unless they can unite and gain strong support in the armed forces, which they now lack. Attendance at recent public antigovernment demonstrations suggests that the opposition so far lacks widespread support.

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Executive Offices of the White House

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Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

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Executive Secretary, National Security Council

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

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The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

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Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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